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NOTES
THE VALUE OF OPINION EVIDENCE IN WILL CON-
TESTS WHETHER DELIVERD BY LAY OR
EXPERT WITNESSES.
On June 14, 1932, Judge S. S. Willis delivered a learned
and comprehensive opinion in the case of Dossenbach, et al. v.
Reidhar, et al.,' which, inter alia, dealt with the subject set forth
in the title to thins note.
The mental capacity of the testator was sought to be im-
peached on evidence wich, if true, established that he was an
extreme miser, cunning and rapacious, and slothful in his person
and dress. On these alleged basic facts both lay and expert
witnesses gave opinions that the testator lacked testamentary
capacity The will was sustained by a directed verdict and the
action of the circuit court affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The court said the basic facts on which the witnesses rested
their opinions related,
"to matters of taste, and amounted to nothing more than a differ-
ence of opinion between the testator and the witnesses as to what was
appropriate to a man in his circumstances. Differences in taste among
those in similar circumstances proves nothing respecting their rela-
tive mental capacities. Indeed, taste, according to Burke, is a 'delicate
and aerial faculty, which seems too volatile to endure even the chains
of a definition, and cannot be properly tried by any test, nor regulated
by any standard.' Such matters in any event did not concern
his mental capacity, but reflected merely his taste and culture. Cf.
Smith v. Smith, 243 Ky. 241. In Cecil v. Anher, 176 Ky. 198, a New
Jersey case was thus quoted:
"'Miserly disposition and habits, unclean modes of life, dishonesty,
even to theft, profanity and violence of temper, of themselves do not
affect the claim of testamentary capacity, for obviously a man may
be a thief, a miser, unclean, profane, and of ungovernable temper and
yet have testamentary capacity. " "In re Lewis Will, 33 N. J. Eq. 227.
"It is the accepted rule in this jurisdiction that the opinions of
witnesses constitute competent evidence in will cases, but such opin-
ions will not be sufficient evidence to take a, case to the jury, unless
the facts upon wbich the opinions are based are such as tend to
establish . lack of testamentary capacity. Wiggznton v. Wiggznton,
194 Ky. 385; Bodine v. Bodine, 241 Ky. 706; Schrodt v. Sc7zrodt, 181
Ky. 174; Burdon v. Burdon, 225 Ky. 480. In Mullins v. Mullins, 229
Ky. 103, it was said:
"If the facts detailed by the witnesses on which they base their
opinions simply show acts or conduct not out of line with the course
1245 Ky. 471.
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of acts and conduct usually pursued by mankind, the opinion of the
witnesses would be overcome by the statement of facts on. which the
opinion was based, and would be worthy of little or no consideration.
Wood v. Corcoran, 190 Ky. 621, 228 S. W 32; Langford v. Miles, 189
Ky. 515, 225 S. W 246."
Contestants of the will relied also on the testimony of
physicians who held themselves out to be experts m mental
pathology and on the same facts set forth in a hypothetical ques-
tion offered the opinion that the testator was "pathological"
and lacked testamentary capacity
The opinion said'
"It will be observed that the hypothetical question was based on
scattered incidents detailed by many witnesses, covering isolated and
widely separated occasions, and presented no question of science or
medical skill. Barret v. Brand, 179 Ky. 740; Gay v. Gay, 183 Ky. 238.
"The answer of the doctor was not responsive to the question, it
bore no rational relation to the subject involved, and it added no pro-
bative weight to the circumstances upon which it was predicated."2
The observations of the experts "were not based upon
scientific matters" but on the same items of testator's conduct
and habit, as those upon which the non-expert witnesses
grounded their opinions. These opiions said the court, did not
constitute a scintilla of evidence, although one expert was bold
enough to say upon this inconclusive foundation that he con-
sidered the testator was "a pathological or diseased person"
whom he considered "had a pathological or diseased mind."
The witness however admitted that he reached this conclusion
because of his observation and knowledge that the testator was
a miser whose whole mentality was governed by this complex.
This physician-a self commended mental pathology expert
-said.
"Miserliness warps all of the better characteristics of a human
being. When a man, as I look at it, debases himself to the extent that
he is willing to deprive his heart, to deprive his mind of all the
pleasures that he might have in this life, whose sole thought is money,
whose idea of affection is small, who is cold-blooded I don't believe
that that man can know his estate as he should know it. I don't
think he can recognize the demands of his relatives upon him. I don't'
think he can under those circumstances take a rational survey of his
estate and dispose of it as he should. I believe the mind of a man
who is governed absolutely by money becomes so warped that he is
wrong-he is abnormal-he has an unhealthy mind and he is not
2 Newman v. Dixon, B. & T. Co., 205 Ky. 31, Cecil v. Anhezr, 176
Ky. 198; Broyles v. Able, 208 Ky. 672; Bush v. Lisle, 89 Ky. 393; Lang-
ford v. Miles, 189 Ky. 515.
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capable of performing the necessary and sometimes very difficult duties
of disposing of a very large estate."
The court's opinion proceeds to value this testimony-
"The opinions of expert witnesses upon subjects of common knowl-
edge have no more probative value than the opimons of other wit-
nesses. In dealing with insanity, or disease, expert opinion is accepted
as a matter of necessity (L. & N. B. R. Co. v. Rowland, 227 Ky. 849)
but when an expert's opinion is rested upon the simple facts of life
and everyday occurrences, it possesses no more weight or value than
that of any other intelligent person. Upon matters of common knowl-
edge and every day experiences, the ordinarily intelligent man can
make the appropriate deductions and derive the correct conclusions,
and no basis exists for the expatiation of an expert. Gay v. Gay, 183
Ky. 238; Barrett v. Brand, 179 Ky. 740. Moore on Facts, Sec. 1245, p.
1384. There was no fact stated in the testimony of Dr. Pope tending to
show that Mr. Reidhar did not have testamentary capacity when he
wrote his will in 1916. His opinions rested upon incidents or acts not in-
compatible with a rational mind. Humphrey v. Nea7, 199 Ky. 498. Such
an opinion added no probative value to the facts given. Berry v. aLfe
Deposit, Etc., Co., 96 Md. 45, 53 Atl 720."
In briefing this case for the appellant, the writer of this
article, collected and distinguished the cases which justified
the conclusions so clearly and learnedly set forth in the opinion.
Without undue elaboration it was argued-
One. Opinions of witnesses, lay or expert, are of little value
as opposed to testator's actual life or methods of doing business.
An opinion is valueless if it is based on facts in evidence which
did not show marked or any variance in testator's behavior from
the normal or even exhibited the slightest evidence of a dis-
ordered mind. The opinion whether of lay or experts, is worth
no more than the "facts" upon winch it is based and the opin-
ion of persons having only casual contacts with testator have
no value at all. As was stated in Clark v Young, 3 "by evidence
is meant something of substance and relevant consequence, and
not vague, uncertain or irrelevant matter not having the quality
of proof, or having fitness to induce conviction."4
Two. What is a disposing mind must be ascertained by the
facts of each case and not by any comprehensive definition. An
opinion on testamentary capacity winch is not based on mental
examination or observation and winch ignores the psychology of
the individual and attempts deduction from testator's alleged
3 146 Ky. 377.
4 See Hays v. Perry, 87 Mo. 569; Homer v. Bucksnglzam, 103 Md.
556; In re Draper, 215 Pa. 314; Wood v. Corcoran, 190 Ky. 621, Hage-
dorn v. Seott, 228 Ky. 582; Moran v. Moran, 233 Ky. 526; Holmes v.
West, 81 W. Va. 326.
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departure from standard or pattern behavior is not sufficient to
take the question to the jury
If a testator is not proven to be irrational or incompetent
by the threefold test of testamentary capacity, the law rejects
the expert's theory that the testator could not be rational, where
the expert's opinion is based upon certain pathological symptoms,
or from an attitude of mind leading to the practice of miserliness
which is a mere degree of thrift.5
Three. Evidence or observation that the testator was a
miser, slovenly and unneat in his habits or person, will not
support an opinion, whether delivered by lay or expert wit-
nesses, that the testator was'without will making capacity An
opinion by an expert based on such facts has no higher sanctity
than that of a lay witness.6
Four. When an expert leaves the realm of his particular
field of science and bases his conclusions upon matters within
the scope of common knowledge and experience, such as that
being a miser renders a testator incapable to make a will, the
expert's opinion is entitled to no more weight than the opinion
of a lay witness, which i§ none at all.7
5Langford's Admr v. Miles, et a7.., 189 Ky. 515, 225 S. W 246;
Bush, et al. v. Lisle, et al., 89 Ky. 293; McDaniel's Will, 2 J. J. Marshall
336, Robinson v. Paxton, 210 Ky. 575, 276 S. W 501, Kidd, et al. v.
R aius, et al., 241 Ky. 133, 43 S. W (2d) 501, Menninger on the'Human.
Mind; In re ,hSnhmdt's Will, 12 N. Y. Supp. 464, Kentucky Traction &
Terminal Company v. Brackett, 210 Ky. 756; Kentucky Traction &
Terminal Company v. Roschi's Admr., 186 Ky. 371, Louisville, H. I
St. L. Ry. Co. v. Jolly's Admx., 20 Ky. Law Rep. 989, 90 S. W 977.
aWood v. Corcoran, 190 Ky. 621, Lewis Case, 33 N. J. Equity 226,
Daily's Admr v. Dailey, 184 Ky. 455, Broyles v. Abell, Jr., Admr., 208
Ky. 672; Mullins v. Mullins, 229 Ky. 104, Redeman v. Ruff, 196 Ky. 471,
Talbott, Executor v. Giltner, 179 Ky. 571, Cecil's Exec. v. Anhzer, 176
Ky. 198; Burdon v. Burden's Admx., 225 Ky. 393; Bush v. Lisle, 89 Ky.
393; Clarke v. Young, 146 Ky. 187; Wiggznton v. Wigginton, 194 Ky.
385.
,Barrett, Admr v. Brand, 179 Ky. 740; Gay v. Gay, 183 Ky. 238;
Cecil's Executor v. Anhier, 176 Ky. 198; Newman v. Dixon Bank &
Trust Company, Exr., 205 Ky. 31, Langford Executor v. Miles, 189 Ky.
515, Thompson v. Jordon, 222 Ky. 788; MeDamel's Will, 2 J. 3. Marsh
336; Robinson v. Paxton, 210 Ky. 575, Kidd v. Rodfis, 241 Ky. 133;
Smith v. Smith, 243 Ky. 241, Doyle v. Schafer, 223 Ky. 83; Virginia v.
Hawk, 160 Fed. 348; Branard v. Brainard, 259 Ill. 613; Carnahan v.
Hamilton, 265 Ill. 508; Kentucky Traction d Terminal Company v.
Brackett, 210 Ky. 756, Louisville, Henderson & St. Louis Railroad v.
Jolly's Admx., 90 S. W 977; i re Schmitt Will, 129 N. Y. Supp. 464;
Bodine v. Bodine, 241 Ky. 706, Advance Sheets February 1S, 1932;
Moates v. Rose, 46 S. W (2d) 100, Advance Sheets, March 22, 1932;
L. & N. v. Conn, 179 Ky. 478; Paducak Street. Railway Company v.
Graham, 15 Ky. L. R. 748; Raleigh v. *Donaho, 238 Ky. 480; 22 C. 3'.
Evidence, page 519, See. 606; Chicago & C. R. R. Co. v. Illinois Com-
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Five. Expert testimony is regarded as hired evidence and
even when competent, is entitled to very little weight and must
be received with .care. It is -the weakest evidence known to the
law. Expert opinion contrary to the conclusions fairly to be
drawn from the facts m evidence, concerning the -testator on
winch the opimon is based are mere theories which cannot be
accepted or applied. Such testimony is without probative value.8
ALFRED SELLiGmAx,
Of the Lomsville (Ky.) Bar.
merce Commusoner, 236 fIl. 6256 Tunks, et al. v. Vincent, 241 Ky. 379,
Advance Sheets, January 28, 1932; Page on Wills, Vol. 1, Ed. 1928,
page 697; In re Collins, 174 Cal. 663; Kentucky Digest, Vol. 8, page 671,
Key 569-570; Kentucky Traction d Termznal Co. v. Humhlrey, 168 Ky.
611.
,Smith v. Smith, 5 Ky. Op. 722; Ky Traction & Termznal Go. v.
Humphrey, 168 Ky. 611, Security Finance Corp. v. Cook, 233 Ky. 124;
L. & XV. R. R. Co. v. Rowland?'s Admr., 227 Ky. 841, Bush v. Scale, et al.,
89 Ky. 293.
